The rise in private share ownership over the last decade is an interesting but relatively poorly researched issue in Australia. In the expectation that relations between large companies and their shareholders are already important and will become increasingly so, we report exploratory longitudinal studies of two aspects of the interaction. Regression analysis of shareholders' demographic and attitudinal characteristics, drawn from National Social Science and Australian Electoral Study surveys, shows what shareholders might expect from their companies. Content-analysis of corporate annual reports shows how two companies have reacted; here we compare Coles Myer, the subject of recurrent scandal, with Amcor, as a model of corporate responsiveness. We conclude that widespread share ownership is conducive to increasing social tension across a range of dimensions.
and the NRMA. Rising from a figure of some 14 percent in 1991, a slight majority of Australian adults are now share owners. Under this neoliberal shift (cf. Dean and Hindess, 1998; Dean, 1999) , the interaction between companies and their increasingly numerous small shareholders is gaining sociopolitical salience (e.g. Ethical Investment Association, 2001; Rose, 2001; Shareholders' Project, 2001a , 2001c . But the interaction is shrouded in uncertainty. Events at Coles Myer in March 2002 show this. The company's announcement that it was to phase out its shareholder discount cards made headlines around the country. Since their introduction in the early 1990s, these cards had induced a ten-fold increase in the number of Coles Myer's shareholders, with the overwhelming majority owning only small parcels of shares. And now, neither the company nor financial and social analysts knew quite how these new owners would react to the loss of what had quickly become a customary privilege.
Share ownership itself, let alone the interaction between investors and their companies, has been little studied in sociology. This article is a step toward filling that gap. We present longitudinal studies of two aspects of private share ownership: first, a study of shareholders' sociopolitical characteristics that might be expected to inform their expectations of their companies. Second, we examine corporate responsiveness to changes in the composition of their ownership. After showing the trend in share ownership through figures reported by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX, 2000 (ASX, , 2001 , we note first that both the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Coalition support private investment, and then that claims that shareholders demand a 'triple bottom line' of financial, social and environmental returns are becoming increasingly common (e.g. Elkington, 1998; Shareholders' Project, 2001a) . 1 On that basis, we take 'party identification', 'environmentalism' and 'social concern' as attitudinal variables for the two phases of our analysis.
In the first phase, we compare responses to questions on share ownership in the 1995/96 International Social Science Survey (ISSS; Kelley et al., 1998) with data from the 2001 Australian Electoral Study (AES; Bean et al., 2002) , carried out in conjunction with the 2001 federal election.
2 Adding demographic data, we use regression analysis to develop a three-stage predictive model, where we examine the demographic and attitudinal variables separately and then jointly. This gives us a guide to what investors might expect of their companies. We then shift the focus from shareholders to corporations. Here we compare Coles Myer's annual reports with those of another large Australian company, Amcor, which are models of the rhetorical impression management definitive of the genre (White and Hanson, 2000, 2002a) . Using content-analysis to track shifts in the two companies' attention to environmental, social and political issues, we find a relatively weak presentation of responsiveness in Coles Myer's reports that matches its uncertainty over how its shareholders would react to the phasing out of their discount cards. We conclude that Coles Myer has contributed to the waking of a sleeping giant by first taking its owners for granted and then letting them down, and that this failure in interaction is a harbinger of continuing sociopolitical disputes. Our first step is to show the scale of changes in share ownership in Australia.
Share ownership in Australia
In a series of surveys on share ownership in Australia the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) found that in the single decade of the 1990s the number of direct and indirect share owners more than tripled, to a combined level of around 52 percent (ASX, 2000 (ASX, , 2001 . 'Direct ownership' refers to shares or units in a trust that are bought through a broker, received as an inheritance or gift, or allocated in an employee share scheme or demutualization. 'Indirect ownership' refers to investment in either a managed fund or a personal (privately arranged) superannuation fund that is invested wholly or partly in the stockmarket. Using the ASX's data, we show in Figure 1 the trends in the percentages of Australians who own shares, both directly and in total (directly and indirectly combined).
By 1999, a majority of adult Australians were at least nominally participating in the market. Furthermore, since the ASX's definitions of direct and indirect ownership do not include the general superannuation funds now mandatory for all wage and salary earners, Australians' exposure to the market is even more pronounced than these already striking figures suggest. White et al.: Share ownership Many of the new investors entered the market through the demutualizations and the full and partial privatizations of the mid-to late 1990s. The number of shareholders in these entities certainly tends to be far higher than those in other large Australian companies. Taking the figures from the companies' annual reports in 2001, we show this comparison in Table 1 . Since we will use Amcor later, we include it here, even though it does not have one of the largest share registers.
While the privatizations and demutualizations of the 1990s did bring large numbers of new investors to the market, a trend towards increased share ownership was already evident. We show this for Coles Myer, National Australia Bank and Amcor in Figure 2 . The near-doubling in number of Amcor's owners, or the tripling in those of the National Australia Bank, were far more typical for large Australian companies than the ten-fold increase that Coles Myer achieved through its shareholder discount cards. The ASX (2001) suggests that this trend towards increased ownership will continue. It has found that once people buy shares they tend first to retain them and then to invest more. For example, it noted that 84 percent of the 1.6 million recipients of shares in NRMA had kept all of their allotment, and that only 13 percent had sold all of their shares. Similarly, it found that almost all investors in the second Telstra float had paid the second instalment on their shares rather than selling their entitlements, and that around three-quarters of them hoped to participate further in the market. Whether that translates into action remains to be seen. Nevertheless, if those who entered the market in the 1990s do both remain there and invest more, if they are joined by current non-owners through policies on employee share acquisition schemes or on self-provision in retirement, and if members of the institutional funds that are major investors in the market are included, then share ownership does seem to suggest new sociopolitical possibilities in Australia. In the next section we note approaches to them.
Shareholders: sociopolitical characteristics
There is no clear evidence of the details on how Australian shareholders differ from other Australians in their political, social and environmental commitments. Thus, despite the background literature in the area, we have little basis on which to suggest the extent that pressure for greater corporate social responsibility and accountability through mechanisms such as 'triple bottom line reporting' will be supported. In this section, we examine the social and political characteristics of shareholders.
We analyse data from two academic surveys, the 1995/96 National Social Science Survey, and the 2001 Australian Election Study. Both surveys were designed to be nationally representative of Australian adults aged 18 and over, and contain 2438 and 2010 cases respectively. In the 1995/96 ISSS, questions on share ownership asked if respondents owned shares 'in the company you work for'? The ISSS also asked if respondents owned shares in 'other companies, or share market funds'? We examined the latter question in this research. The shares question from the 2001 AES that we use, read: 'Do you own shares in any company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (shares registered in your name or that of your family company)?' 3 The questions from these two national surveys are not equivalent, for, using the ASX's definitions, the 1995/96 question identified both indirect and direct share owners, while the 2001 question was limited to owners of direct shares. However, since this difference is not critical here, we contrast 'share owners' and non-share owners from both surveys as our dependent variables.
We examine both demographic and attitudinal independent variables. For the regression models, for each set of data we constructed dummy variables for sex (men), tertiary education as opposed to non-tertiary, location in a large city, income groups and age groupings. The categories of demographic independent variables in the two surveys were identical, with one trivial exception: in 1995/96 the two highest-income groups were '$50,000-$75,000' and 'over $75,000', and in 2001 they were '$50,000-$80,000' and 'over $80,000'.
The 'triple bottom line' of financial, social and environmental returns is linked to the 'corporate social responsibility' that is becoming a mantra in OECD countries (e.g. Business for Social Responsibility, 2000) . Since the period between 1995/96 and 2001 saw a rapid increase in share ownership in Australia, we expect to find differences between the two surveys in terms of shareholder positions over environmental, social and political attitudes. Specifically, we expect that in 2001, environmental sympathizers and the 'socially concerned' should be more likely to be shareholders than in the 1995/96 survey.
While it may seem intuitively obvious that owning shares should be more closely associated with the Coalition, ALP voters have supported a degree of private ownership (e.g. Braithwaite, 1988; Western, 1999) . The rise in private investment emerged under the Hawke and Keating governments, and, on the grounds of a fiscal need for individuals to provide for their own welfare, the ALP supported the demutualizations and privatizations of the 1990s.
4 Shareholders' support for one or another of the major political groupings is then moot.
We constructed our measures of 'party identification' in the two surveys as scale variable (0 = Labor, 0.5 = other parties, 1 = Coalition). Attitudinal questions on 'environmentalism' differed, although they were reasonably comparable for our purposes. In the 1995/96 survey we examined responses to an environmentalist 'feelings thermometer' question, while in 2001 respondents were asked how likely they were to join an environmental group or movement.
5 Measurement of 'social concern' was more problematic. In the end, we selected the three disparate issues of immigration, land rights and maternity leave, which we took as reasonable gauges of respondents' 'social' commitments. Very similar questions in the two surveys measured the opinion that 'immigrants increase the crime rate', the degree of 'confidence in the process of Aboriginal land rights', and the extent of 'support for women's right to parental leave'. We expected that 'socially concerned' respondents would respond less favourably on the first of these, but support the other two.
Data were analysed with SPSS 10, using logistic regression to predict the probability of share ownership on the basis of the values of the independent variables. This technique is appropriate for analysing binary dependent variables, such as owning/not owning shares (Agresti, 1996) . For the analysis, we rescored all scale variables to range between 0 and 1. We did not replace missing data.
Odds ratios calculated from the logits (i.e. the exponential of the logit is interpretable as an odds ratio) facilitate the interpretation of the logistic regression estimates. In the multiple logistic regression results presented in Tables 3-5 , odds ratios for scale variables represent the difference between the extreme values on each scale. Odds ratios for dummy variables contrast each dummy variable with its respective reference category. For example, in the Table 3 'Demographic' model, those earning $75,000 or more are 8.7 times more likely than the under-$20,000 income reference group to own shares, as opposed to not owning shares, after controlling for the influence of other independent variables in the regression model.
The inferential tests we use -Wald statistics, based on the chi-squared distribution -test the probability that the logistic regression coefficients are zero in the population. In the regression tables, statistical significance at less than the .05 and .01 levels is indicated with one and two asterisks respectively. Before subjecting our dependent variables to regression analysis, however, we consider the bivariate relationships between demographic variables and share ownership for the two surveys in Table 2 .
While we note above that the measure of share ownership from the 1995/96 survey included both direct and indirect owners of shares, and in 2001 we only had access to direct owners, the increase in ownership over such a short period is nonetheless striking, from approximately 24 percent to 45 percent. Nevertheless, similar socio-demographic patterns of ownership are apparent across the surveys. Men are slightly more likely to own shares than women, ownership increases in a linear fashion with age, and university graduates are over-represented among owners. Locality also has an impact, with those living in large cities more likely to own shares, particularly in 2001. Share ownership increases with income, with Coalition supporters much more likely to own shares than their Labor counterparts. The measure of association statistics (Cramer's V) suggests that income, age and political party identification are most strongly associated with owning shares. They also indicate that the income, tertiary education and location effects were all stronger in 2001 than they were in the mid-1990s.
While the percentages in Table 2 illustrate the bivariate relationships between our independent variables and share ownership, in order to analyse the social characteristics of share owners more rigorously, we employ a multivariate technique -multiple logistic regression analysis (Tables 3 and  4) . For each set of data, we estimated three regression models. The first 'demographic' model includes the variables sex, age, education, location and income; in the second 'attitudinal' model we considered the effects of four attitudinal variables; and in the third model ('All') we combined the demographic and attitudinal variables. The results for 1995/96 are presented first in Table 3 .
In the first model, the demographic factors of age, income and gender affect the propensity to own shares, although tertiary education and location were not statistically significant predictors of owning shares in the multivariate case. The likelihood of owning shares increased in a linear 
Sources: Kelley et al. (1998) , Bean et al. (2002) .
manner with age. Predictably, it also tended to increase with higher levels of income. For example, those earning the highest income ($75,000 or more) were almost nine times more likely than the lowest-income earners (less than $20,000) to own shares. The amount of variance in the dependent variable 'explained' by this socio-demographic model, around 15 percent (i.e. pseudo R-squared = .15), is a reasonable result for social data. In the second model we considered only the attitudinal variables. These were weakly correlated with the dependent variable, with a pseudo Rsquared of just .04. On the basis of the statistical tests, only two of the associations between the attitudinal variables and share ownership were likely to hold among all Australians. Sympathy for environmentalists had no effect, and the results for the two 'social variables' -confidence in land rights and support for women's right to parental leave -were not statistically significant even at the .05 level. However, supporters of immigration were more likely to own shares, a relationship that was highly significant statistically (p < .01). In addition, Coalition identifiers were twice as likely as Labor Party supporters to own shares. When we combined the variables in the third model, both significant attitudinal variables retained their effects. The portrait of shareholders that emerges here, just at the cusp of the boom in private investment, is then hardly surprising. A typical share owner in 1995/96 was an older man, who earned a good income and supported the Coalition, but who was also likely to link immigration with high rates of crime. This sets a comparative benchmark for any change between 1995/96 and 2001. The findings from the 2001 data are presented in Table 4 .
The 2001 results show that the overall effects of our independent variables on share ownership have increased. The pseudo r-squared figures are of a somewhat higher magnitude compared to the earlier data, with demographic factors again accounting for the bulk of the variation in share ownership. With specific reference to our expectations, the combined demographic and attitudinal variables in Model 3 offer mixed support for proponents of the 'triple bottom line' or the 'third way'. Of the demographic variables, only gender and location do not have significant effects. The Shadow Treasurer, Mark Latham, has called for a 'stakeholder policy' for Australia to fulfil its 'potential as a sharemarket democracy', where all 'citizens should have a stake in the market economy' (Latham, 2001: 26) . However, share ownership does not seem to mark the removal of social cleavages envisaged in the 'stakeholder economy'.
The generally stronger effects in 2001 of education, and the stable influence of income, suggest instead the persistence and even strengthening of social divisions. As we expected, environmental supporters are significantly more likely to be shareholders than non-environmentalists, as are those who support immigration. Conversely, those 'socially concerned' over the issue of land rights are significantly less likely to own shares, while the relation between share ownership and Coalition support has increased slightly across the surveys.
While we have considered share ownership thus far as a simple dichotomy between owners and non-owners, questions in the Australian Election Study also allow us to disaggregate share ownership on the basis of the number of companies in which owners have invested. The AES did not include questions on large investors, although it seems reasonable to take diversification of share portfolios as a proxy measure for portfolio size. Having established the importance of key variables such as income and age in predicting share ownership, we now extend our analysis to consider four measures of share ownership in Table 5 . In each case, owners of shares in one company, two to five companies, six to ten companies, and more than ten companies, are contrasted with non-owners. 6 The odds ratios in Table 5 indicate that the relationship between share ownership and variables such as income, education and age becomes stronger with increased diversity of investment. As we have already shown, those with tertiary education, or higher incomes, are generally likely to own shares. However, from these results we can see that the disparity in terms of income, education and age is much greater among those who own shares in White et al.: Share ownership in Australia 109 several companies. There is little evidence here of a 'stakeholder economy', as the income differentials among even those owning shares in just one company testify. Overall, the effects of share ownership in Australia are still uncertain. On our measures, shareholders might expect their companies to be environmentally and socially responsive on some issues, but contradictory trends in our social issues make the 'triple bottom line' of economic, social and environmental returns too fuzzy to be useful. Instead of representing socialism by other means, the intensifying differences in terms of income and education suggest a hardening of social divisions (cf. Howard, 1998) . Whether those who are missing out under current policies on share ownership will flex their political muscle electorally is yet to be seen. In the meantime, another political arena is becoming more salient, for the rising numbers of small shareholders give new importance to the interaction between companies and their owners. We shift the focus to examine this, from shareholders to corporations.
Corporations: sociopolitical dimensions of responsiveness
Supporting claims of a 'major shift in the balance of power between public corporations and their owners' (Dunlop, 1998) , a mounting body of evidence shows that companies do respond to formal and informal lobbying by their institutional shareholders (e.g. Drucker, 1991; Useem, 1996; Carleton et al., 1998; Stapledon, 1999) . It is difficult, however, for small investors to be as effective. Even if they did vote as a bloc at corporate AGMs, which would be unlikely in principle and daunting to organize in practice, they typically hold only a minority of shares. In a recent survey of senior executives in Sydney, respondents agreed that small shareholders were largely 'irrelevant, ineffective and misguided in their attempts to influence public companies' (White, 2002) . But while that may be the case formally, 'influence' involves more than lobbying or voting at an AGM. Respondents also granted that corporations 'are driven to communicate and engage with retail investors and activists "out of necessity to protect their reputations", not because the concerns are valid or credible' (White, 2002 , emphasis added); a company's reputation is important for both sales of its products and its reception on the market (e.g. Dowling, 1994) . As the most authoritative form of corporate communication, corporate annual reports are a prime vehicle for this increasingly necessary reputational work.
Since they allow unobtrusive and relatively unmediated access to corporate activity, since their standardization allows comparisons, and since their institutionalization as an annual form of disclosure allows longitudinal study, annual reports have been widely studied (White and Hanson, 2002b) . In one body of findings, both analysts and critical lobbyists like the Australian Shareholders' Association (ASA) treat the narrative components of the reports as simply PR or propaganda (e.g. Stock, 1998) . Even if this were so, it is not a handicap here, since we are concerned with corporate interaction rather than with operational action as such. While we take it for granted that companies use their reports as impression management, in Goffman's sense (e.g. Neu et al., 1998) , we also assume that the degree of attention paid to particular impressions is in itself informative as to issues that companies see as important in the maintenance of their reputations. So in this phase of the analysis we are interested in the interaction that Coles Myer has shown in relation to the environmental, social and political issues of the first phase. 7 We use Amcor as a comparator, since it has been adept at impression management (White and Hanson, 2000, 2002a; Hanson and White, 2004) . Content-analysis is standard in the study of annual reports. In our version of the method, we first downloaded Coles Myer's and Amcor's reports from 1992 to 2001 (Connect4, 2002) , selected the narrative components, and then stripped them of tables, captions, headings and the like until only continuous prose remained. While conventions in, say, divisional reviews or the managing director's report differed between companies and over time, we standardized what we kept as much as possible. We took words as units of analysis, on the assumption that the use of particular words marks a focus on issues, whatever meanings writers or readers might impute to those words. That is, for this analysis we do not need to distinguish between PR and 'real' reporting.
Environmentalism. To track environmental coverage, we selected words that are routine in discussions of the issue: 'conservation'; 'environment'; 'recycle'; and 'waste'. A company's use of this lexicon might not give a comprehensive measure of its environmental coverage, but it does mark rises and falls in attention paid to the issue. When we counted instances of the four words we included derivatives, subsuming, for example, 'environmental' under 'environment'. Since the reports varied in length, we normalized raw frequencies as scores per thousand words, and then summed the results. Finally, we broke the ten-year span of the study into five duennia and derived mean scores for each of these. The results are graphed in Figure 3 .
The difference is stark. While Coles Myer's operations in retailing and Amcor's in the contentious industries of forestry, pulp-making and packaging did imply different constraints, the companies had issues of recycling and waste disposal in common. Beyond operational matters, however, Amcor seems more alert to its public. Its peak of attention coincided with a peak in the political salience of environmentalism (e.g. Morgan, 2001) , and the fall in its coverage, even after environmental reporting became mandatory, matches the overall institutionalization of environmentalism in Australia (e.g. Jensen-Lee, 2001 ). Coles Myer's reporting appears comparatively grudging. If its owners shared the environmental concern that we found among shareholders more generally, then it was hardly responding to them. Social issues. Our second set of attitudinal variables referred to 'social' concerns. We assume here that increases in the numbers of shareholders should evoke a heightened focus on these issues by their companies. Unlike environmentalism, where questions in the surveys matched themes in annual reports, we do not have equivalent issues here. Instead, we index a 'social' focus through attention to 'corporate governance', for this is linked to 'corporate social responsibility' more generally (e.g. Tricker, 1994; Charkham, 1995) . When managers discuss governance, they typically stress their 'compliance' with regulation, the structures in place to ensure sound 'governance', the 'ethical' conduct of their operations, and their 'responsibility' in a range of contexts. So, repeating the procedure above, we counted, summed, standardized and graphed the incidence of those four words. The results are in Figure 4 .
Both Coles Myer and Amcor showed the increasing attention that we expected, but with an interesting difference in smoothness. Compared with Amcor's steadily rising emphasis on its governance, and by implication on its social responsibility, Coles Myer's coverage jumped sharply from the second to the third duennium, when the reporting of governance became mandatory. Of course, Coles Myer had more reputational repair-work to do then, in the immediate wake of the Yannon affair. Even so, we should stress the gap between corporate practice and corporate self-presentation. While Coles Myer's conduct may have become more 'ethical' post-Yannon, its sustained under-performance on the market might well have led its shareholders to query its 'responsibility'.
Party ID. The third attitudinal variable in the analysis of the survey data concerned political affiliation. Content-analysis is not suitable here, for corporate reports rarely include detailed political discussion. We simply show the extent and breakdown of the donations to political parties that Coles Myer and Amcor reported. Both companies justified their donations in neutral terms. This is the wording that Coles Myer used for several years:
Funding to political parties is determined by the Directors according to their judgement of the balanced needs of a strong political system and the relevance of the policies and practices of the respective parties to the best interests of the company.
Amcor was even more terse in its formula: 'Amcor provides some financial support to a number of political parties.' Given the routine links between the Coalition and the top end of town, however, it might be expected that 'the best interests of the company' would be best served through support for the Coalition, and that 'some financial support' would be unevenly distributed. In Table 6 we show the size of the two companies' donations, and the percentage directed to the Coalition. At first glance, Coles Myer is surprising here. It anticipated the normally adroit Amcor in the fact of its disclosure, and after the peak figure in 1997, which covered the Liberal/National victory in the 1996 federal election, steadily decreased its proportion of donations to the Coalition. The sheer number of its owners, and the preponderance of small shareholders among them, makes it likely that they included a higher percentage of nonCoalition voters than found in companies with smaller registers, and the company might have adjusted to suit them. Conversely, it might have been hedging its bets on the expectation of an ALP victory in 2001. We do not have the data to tell. As for Amcor, while support for parties least likely to legislate on environmental issues was realistic, it is still striking that the roughly consistent two-to-one ratio in its donations fits our earlier finding that share owners are twice as likely as non-share owners to identify with the Coalition. If its shareholders are typical of shareholders in general, then Amcor has again successfully read their mood. Now, we should stress the limits of this approach to annual reports. Given the working through mutual double-guessing, any impression management is inherently uncertain, and it is impossible to read either actual practice or share owners' responses from the self-presentation in annual reports. Any student of them could confirm Anderson and Epstein's (1996: 13) point that the 'most important conclusion that can be drawn from a review of prior studies is the conflicting evidence they provide'. But although accounts of annual reports range from the ASA's description of them as 'gibberish' to claims that discussion there is a 'reasonable surrogate for real activity ' (McLean, 2001b) , they do show the reputational work that companies must undertake. The link between corporate practice and corporate self-presentation in this work is certainly contingent, but so long as it is not arbitrary small shareholders can exert an influence through the expectations that their companies are tacitly obliged to meet.
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It is necessary but not sufficient for companies to meet the strictly financial element in these expectations. Shareholders can tolerate financial setbacks in the short term, especially if they are habituated to responsiveness; Amcor's owners showed this when the company faltered in the mid-to late 1990s. Compared with the relatively smooth blend of performances in its interaction with its shareholders, this responsiveness was missing in Coles Myer's reports. It then shows the potential consequences when a company talks the talk of valuing its owners but cannot walk the walk of its promises. The financial benefit of the discount cards quickly became a customary right, and the company did not have the interactional goodwill to cushion the breaching of that right when it announced the phasing out of the cards. The scale of its betrayal is commensurate with its success in attracting hundreds of thousands of small shareholders. In the widespread resentment that it generated, Coles Myer might well have contributed to the waking of a sleeping giant in new patterns of share ownership in Australia.
Conclusion: where to from here?
It is too early to tell whether share ownership will continue to rise in Australia and what its sociopolitical effects will be. For example, private investment may have peaked after the surge through the 1990s. The surveys in 1995/96 and in 2001 showed little change in the characteristics of share owners, as the odds ratios for our demographic variables were almost identical (i.e. allowing for sampling error). The educated Coalition-voters with high incomes whom we found to be share owners in both the mid-1990s and 2001 may continue to invest, but this does not mean that the number of investors entering the market will continue to rise. It also remains to be seen whether small shareholders and their companies can fulfil optimistic predictions of 'inclusive communities', 'dialogical stakeholders' and 'authentic corporate citizenship' in a 'sustainable capitalism' (Wheeler, 1998; Birch, 2001) . Amid that uncertainty, however, we are confident first of a rise in both activism and electoral pressure on the part of shareholders, and then of conflictual strains within those tendencies.
Shareholder activism is in its infancy in Australia. While some small shareholders in Coles Myer did agitate over the Yannon affair, for example, as at the rowdy AGM in 1997, the company's institutional investors were the drivers of change then. Large shareholders also forced the reforms that included suspension of the discount cards. Yet institutional investors are themselves now coming under pressure. One straw in the wind is a general acrimony against the banks that are among the largest shareholders in all major Australian companies. Another is agitation by shareholder activists. There are currently ginger groups of investors in around seven Australian companies, mostly concerned with environmental and 'ethical' issues. We expect this number to rise. Then there is the ASA, which is a regular critic of corporate activity in its newspaper's columns and at AGMs. But while these various groups will certainly intensify their pressure on large companies, that pressure will be contradictory. For example, on the Friedmanite grounds that the only 'social responsibility' companies face is to make profits for their owners, the ASA opposes the ginger groups' 'ethical' campaigns and claims that 'stakeholders' must be satisfied (e.g. McLean, 2001a) .
The more diffuse electoral pressure that shareholders can exert will be just as tangled. As seen in current governmental responses to scandals over the auditing of Australian and American companies, the legitimacy of the deregulated economy of private investment relies on the re-regulation of corporate governance. The ASA enacts the contradictions here, for despite its trust in the invisible hand it has a corporatist relation with the peak regulatory body, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC); for example, the two organizations jointly published an 'information sheet' on shareholder activism (ASIC, 2002) . Or as seen in the way that politicians from all parties criticize the banks, there is the scent of votes in policies on 'community responsibility'. This suggests a further tangle, for the banks' success in recent years has been a major factor in the growth of the superannuation funds that all parties also support; increased control of them might well lead to lower returns there, which in turn will be a factor in electoral volatility.
The rise in share ownership is then conducive to increasing social conflict, across a range of dimensions. The widening gap we found between share owners and non-share owners represents an interesting hardening of social divisions in society. Policies on share ownership have made both the Coalition and the ALP hostages to the vagaries of the market because of the importance of ownership for the share-owning segment; a major fall in prominent sections of the market could pose a considerable political threat. Above all, the millions of new shareholders have only just begun to exercise the formal and informal pressure they command as the media coverage of AMP's problems in mid-2002 illustrates. On the other hand, our survey results show stability, and perhaps even the hint of a stronger relationship between party affiliation and share ownership. This implies that if there is a backlash, it may well affect the Coalition. This is not only because the Coalition stands to be blamed as the incumbent government, but because half of all share holders are Coalition supporters 9 and, given the relatively even balance of voting in lower house elections, a relatively small antigovernment vote by angry shareholders could have a disproportionate impact at the polls.
Although our studies of shareholders' demographic and attitudinal characteristics, and the responsiveness shown in corporate annual reports, are necessarily exploratory, we make the following predictions. First, as disputes centred around share ownership and corporate governance become increasingly common, and calls continue to emerge from the corporate sector for increased legislation against shareholder activism, the likelihood of a spillover into the political arena will increase. Second, as a consequence of the first point, share ownership and its sociopolitical implications will increasingly become a focus for social analysis and political debate. 1 Schaltegger et al. (1996 ) in Crowther's (2002 words, claim that: 'such forms of accounting were used in the past to placate external environmental activists, but are now regarded as an important source of information for the internal management of the firm'. However, based on his own study of corporate accounting in the United Kingdom, Crowther (2002: 59) , found:
Notes
… that neither environmental activists nor the internal management processes of the firm have any significant influence on the development of environmental accounting [rather …] the prime use of environmental accounting data is for the production of reports for external consumption instead of for internal decision making purposes. in one company'; 'Yes, in two to five companies'; 'Yes, in six to ten companies'; 'Yes, in more than ten companies.' We combined responses for all categories of share ownership, and contrasted these with those who did not own shares. 4 As proponents of the 'third way' argue, diversifying share ownership might even mark the achievement of the ALP's long-held objective of the democratic socialization of industry, production, distribution and exchange, to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in these fields (e.g. Botsman and Latham, 2001 ). 5 The environmentalism question in 1995/96 asked respondents to rank 'environmentalists' on a thermometer ranging from 0, representing 'very cold', to 100, representing 'very warm'. We contrasted those exhibiting warmer responses (i.e. 50-100) against cooler (i.e. 0-49). In 2001, respondents were asked: 'How likely are you to join any environmental groups or movements? (responses: 'I'm already a member'; 'Not a member but have considered joining'; 'Not a member, and have not considered joining'; 'Would never consider joining'). We contrasted members + consider joining with the remainder. 6 That is, in the models in Table 5 we regressed our independent variables on binary dependent variables that measured ownership of shares in one company versus non-owners, 2-5 companies versus non-owners, 6-10 companies versus non-owners and more than 10 companies versus non-owners. 7 The fact that these issues are subject to statutory requirements is a mark of the rising salience of 'corporate social responsibility'. The reporting of 'corporate governance' became mandatory in 1996, and of environmental issues and political donations in 1998. 8 The current chairman of Coles Myer, Stan Wallis, was formerly the managing director of Amcor and then chairman of its board. He was appointed to the chairmanship of Coles Myer as a cleanskin, in the changes after the Yannon affair. Since we do not know the details of his contributions to the reports of either company we bracket this connection. 9 Of the share owners in the 2001 AES, 49.6 percent were Coalition identifiers, 28.4 percent Labor supporters, and 14.1 percent did not identify with any political party. Among the minor parties, 2.2 percent supported the Australian Democrats, 2.7 percent supported the Greens, 2.1 percent One Nation, and the remainder identified with other parties.
